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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
~DEAN HALES and VALDA HALES, 
Appellants & Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
VANCE PETERSON and MARGERY 
PETERSON, d.b.a. Valley Builders 
Supply Company, and 
PAUL CALDWELL, 
Respondents & Defendants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I CASE No. 
r 
I 9294 
This law suit was commenced to recove-r damages for 
the wrongful death of Nila Hales, a nine year old daugh-
ter of Dean Hales and Valda Hales, caused in an accident 
which took place on October 24, 1958, at approximately 
8:45 a.m., immediately in front of the Elementary School 
in Redmond, Sevier County, Utah. At the time of the acci-
dent, Nila Hales was on her way to school where she was 
enrolled as a student in the fourth grade. Her mother, 
Valda Hales, who taught at the school, had driven them 
in her car from the adjoining town of Salina, where they 
lived. There is a street in front of the school and to the 
south, which street runs in an east-west direction. The 
school house sits back in from the street approximately 
58 ft. 5 inches. (Exhibit Pl. no. 9). Playgrounds are to the 
east and west of the schoolhouse. On the morning of the 
accident, Mrs. Hales parked her car, as usual on the south 
side of the street in front -of the school. It was behind and 
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to the west of Principal Roger Nielson's pickup truck. 
The vehicles were approximately two feet apart and with-
in about six to eight inches from the curb (R 156). After 
parking in front of the school house and across the street, 
Mrs. Hales went directly to the school house, and Nila 
took some eggs and pop bottles to an adjoining store about 
three to four buildings east from where the car was parked 
and on the same side of the street, to exchange for some 
candy and Halloween treats. 
Two witnesses, David Weldon and Gerald Christen-
sen, both students at the school, testified that they ob-
served her bring her purchase from the store, put some of 
it in the car, and then pass in front of her mother's car 
and behind the principal's car into the streeet on her way 
to the school house (R 128-174). Some of the evidence as to 
what happeened after this differs in some respects. But at 
the same tin1e the evidence is uncontradicted that Defend-
ant, Paul Caldwell, an employe of Vance PeteTson and 
Margery Peterson, d.b.a. Valley Builders Supply Company 
of Gunnison, Utah, was driving a heavily laden gravel 
truck with approximately six tons of gravel loaded on a 
steel bed with side boards approximately four feet high 
and open at the back end, down the street in an easterly 
direction, passing immediately in front of the elementary 
school grounds. Paul Caldwell, the driver, testified that 
he was traveling 15 to 20 miles per hour, reaching a max-
imum speed of what he estimated to be 20 miles per hour 
(R 145). He stated that he was continually picking up 
speed as he passed in front of the school house (R 148) and 
that he was at his maximum speed when he felt a bump, 
as though th truck had run over something in front of the 
school. He didn't ren1ember of any chuck holes; so he 
stopped his truck and got out and walked back to find 
that he had run over and killed Nila Hales. When ques-
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tioned about the accident by City Marshal, Carl Ander-
son, who was the first officer to arrive at the scene, Mr. 
Anderson testified of their conversation as follows: 
A. "Where I talked to Mr. Caldwell was right by 
the back of his truck and that was the only time I 
talked to him and asked him about his driver's 
license and he took them out and showed them to 
me and I -vvrote down a little notation is all. And 
he said that he did not see the child, but he -vvas 
watching the school children on the north side of 
the street." (R 201) 
No measurements or pictures were taken, or other 
inquiries made until after the body was removed by the 
Peterson Mortuary and the truck moved, except that Mar-
shal Anderson stepped the distance from the body to the 
place where the truck stopped diagonally in the road with 
the front wheels north and left of the center and the back 
vvheels south of the center of the road at about a 20 degree 
angle, -vvhich was 30 to 35 ft. from the body. (R 201). 
Thereafter, the truck and the body were moved. (R 201) 
The testimony -vvi th regard to the position of the body 
on the street was about the same from all witnesses. War-
ren Richard Jensen, the licensed funeral director who 
moved the body, stated that it was practically parallel 
vvith the road, and reasonably close to the center. (R 1G). 
Mrs. Hales testified that the body was lying parallel -vvi th 
the road with the child's head to the east and her feet to 
the west, and with her stomach and right side of her face 
to the oiled surface road. He left leg was extended out 
to the left of her trunk and had not been injured or 
scuffed as much as the right side of the body. One shoe 
\vas n1issing. (R 102). Dr. Ray E. Noys, who examined the 
body, testified that the head was crushed and the brain 
tissue coming out of the right side, that there were abra-
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sions and scuffs principally along the right side of the 
body and the right leg, that there was a six to eight inch 
laceration along the the abdominal cavity at the right 
groin and that the pelvic bone was crushed. The doctor 
further testified that the child's head had been run over, 
and the leg and midsection run over,that the head would 
not be crushed like it was from results of a fall, and that 
there was great pressure to cause the laceration of the 
groin (R. 12). In answer to a prolonged cross examination 
by defendant counsel, the doctor testified as follows: 
Q. "and so in your opinion it (the truck) went 
over her right leg and right groin and threw her 
to the ground and she fractured her skull; is that 
right?" 
A. "I would hardly think that the force throw-
ing her to the ground would fracture her skull to 
the degree it was. I think she either had to be run 
over or else the truck had to hit her some place 
that would come as a great force, but I don't think 
falling to the ground would ever do that much. 
Q. "But being thro-vvn to the ground would do 
that much, would it not?" 
A. "Not that. If they were traveling fifteen miles 
I don't think it would produce that severe-! don't 
think its possible." 
Q. "Then your opinion is that it (truck) ran over 
her leg, groin and her head? 
A. "I would feel that in some n1anner it had ... 
it had done that." (R. 13) 
The testimony of David Weldon, an eye witness, was 
that the child was hit near the center of the road after 
she had hollered "help, help," by tbe front bumper of 
the truck near the right front ferider and was knocked 
forward and the right front wheel passed over her body 
(R 128-129). The defendant, Paul Caldwell, the driver, 
testified that the right rear wheel passed over her body 
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( n 14G). The testimony of these three witnesses establish 
that the wheel or wheels on the right side of the truck 
passed over the body with the right front crushing the 
head and the rear dual wheels crushing the pelvic and 
injuring the right leg. 
As the an1bulance was leaving with the body, the 
road patrolman arrived from Salina and subsequently 
the sheriff and deputy sheriff arrived from Richfield. 
1\,leasurements were taken by them of some blood spots in 
the road, the first one approximately two feet in diameter 
at the spot where the witnesses said the child's body lay, 
(R 110) and anotheT spot about a foot in length and three 
or four inches in -vvidth further east, approximately 4 or 5 
feet toward where the truck stopped. The center of the 
first blood spot was measured to be 18 ft. 5 in. from the 
south curb. (R 79). It was directly North of the alley which 
-vvould be just east of the front end of the principal's car. 
This is about the same distance the child was seen knocked 
from the position where she had walked near the center 
of the road, a point about 18 feet 5 inches north from the 
curb in front of her mother's car. The city officer, Mr. 
Anderson, testified that following the accident he was 
able to see the tire tread left in the road after it had passed 
over the child's body on toward the east where the truck 
had come to a stop approximately 30 to 35 ft. away 
(R 207). The truck driver, Paul Caldwell, in describing 
the course of his truck up to the point of the accident drew 
a line on the map or diagram (Exhibit Pl-9) indicating that 
the right wheels of his truck passed over the blood spot 
\vhere the child had lain, (R-145). The road through this 
area \\'"as straight and -vvithout any appreciable grade. 
There were no vehicles parked behind the Hales car and 
because of the alley and the utility pole, there was no place 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
for parking west on the south side of the street up to the 
post office some 50 ft. away. (Exhibit Pl-9) (F 107). The 
width of the principal's truck was 82 inches, the Hales 
car was 70 inches wide. (R 156) 
The uncontroverted evidence of the case is that the 
decedent reached a position on the road in front of the 
school house after crossing from the south curb toward 
the north when she was hit by the truck and run over at 
least 18 ft. 5 in. into the road. The only controversy in 
the evidence is as to whether the fran t end of the truck 
struck the child first or whether the child was struck by 
some portion of the truck behind the front bumper. Even 
though it appears definite that the child was hit by the 
front of the vehicle and knocked forward parallel with the 
road and the right wheels passed over her body, the plain-
tiff's case is still affected very little if at all by defendant's 
contention that the child was hit by the truck at a point 
behind the front bumper. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
In connection with this appeal, Plaintiff contends: 
1. The trial court erred in not granting plaintiffs a 
directed verdict as requested by the plaintiff, and further 
erred in not granting a motion for new trial or judgment 
notwithstanding verdict for the overwhelming evidence 
in support of plaintiffs and the cumulative errors preju-
dicing the plaintiffs' case. 
2. The trial court committed error in refusing to admit 
evidence submitted by the Plaintiff as to the length of time 
it took each of 14 girls of the same age, size and years of 
experience in school as Nila Hales, the decedent, to walk 
normally, walk fast as they could, and run as fast as they 
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could for a distance of 100 ft.; which evidence of time ele-
nlent was to be used by an expert physicist to determine 
the distance the truck traveling at either 15 or 20 miles 
per hour, would have traveled while the girl traveled from 
the north side of her mother's car at the south curb to the 
point of impact, 18 ft. 5 in. from the south curb, or 11 ft. 
G in. from the north side of her mother's car. Other im-
portant physical facts were deductible from such evidence. 
3. The trial court committed reversible error in refus-
ing to instruct the jury as requested by the plaintiff as 
to presumption of due care of the decedent immediately 
prior to her death as contained in Instruction No. 14, as 
follows: 
"You are instructed that based upon the com-
monly kno\vn fact that the instinct for self-preserv-
ation is such that persons use ordinary and reason-
able care for their own safety. The law permits 
you to asume that Nila Hales, at the time of and 
immediately preceeding the incident in question, 
-vvas exercising due care for her own safety. And 
you may make findings in accordance therewith 
unless you are persuaded from a preponderance of 
the evidence that she was guilty of contributory 
negligence, as elsewhere in these instructions de-
fined." 
4. That the trial Court committed error in instructing 
the jury t\vice, Instruction 8 and Instruction 13, on negli-
gence, proxin1ate cause and contributory negligence and 
telling the jury twice, that the plaintiff may not recover 
unless you find from a preponderance of the evidence ( 1) 
Cald-vvell was negligent, (2) his negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury and (3) there was no negligence 
on the part of Nila Hales that contributed to her own in-
jury, \\~herein the plaintiff was given a double burden of 
overcon1ing t\vo instructions on contributory negligence 
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and where plaintiff should have had the more favorable 
position of an instruction on presumption of due care. 
5. That the court committed error in giving in this 
case an instruction on unavoidable accident, Instruction 
No. 11. It was an incorrect statement of the law when con-
sidered with the other instructions. It further denied the 
decedent her presumption of the right of due care for her 
own safety, reemphasized contributory negligence and 
confused the jury. 
6. Counsel for Defendants was guilty of misconduct 
justifying reversible error and the trial court committed 
error in not granting plaintiff motion for a new trial when 
in his argument to the jury defense counsel stated: 
"That the investigating enforcement officers had 
not given any citation to the defendant driver for 
misconduct and accordingly they had found the 
driver not negligent.'' 
7. The court committed error in not instructing the 
jury as to the law governing the conduct of a driver in 
front of a school house where children of a tender age are 
going to school and playing, and that such driver is not 
permitted to drive 20 miles per hour with a 6 ton load of 
gravel because a posted speed sign indicates 20 miles per 
hour, as t;Ontained in Plaintiff's proposed instructions 8, 
9, and 10. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
ERROR OF TRIAL COURT IN NOT GRANTING 
PLAINTIF'FS A DIRECTED VERDICT AS REQUEST-
ED BY PLAINTIF'F, AND IN NOT GRANTING MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL OR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTAND-
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ING VERDICT BASED ON OVERWHELlVIING EVI-
DENCE SUPPORTING THE PLAINTIFF, AND FOR 
CUMULATIVE ERRORS PREJUDICING PLAINTIFF'S 
CASE. 
The trial court erred in not granting the plaintiff a 
directed verdict as requested by the plaintiff, and further 
erred in not granting a motion for a new trial, or judg-
n1ent notwithstanding verdict, based on the Uncontradict-
ed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the De-
fendant and Respondent herein. Had it not been for the 
confusion of the Jury caused by improper instructions and 
the lack of nstruction requested, the decision would have 
followed the almost universal holding in such cases. The 
instant case when viewed most favorably from all positions 
in favor of the defendant and respondent herein, is almost 
identical to the case of Cotant vs. United States 103 Feder-
al Supplement 770, a recent Idaho case, which case was a 
wrongful death case of a minor child approximately the 
same age as the decedent Nila Hales. In the Cotant case, 
the minor was not at school grounds but was in a residen-
tial section of town. The driver of the vehicle was driving 
a mail truck and testified that he was well acquainted with 
the neighborhood, having driven along this street for about 
a year. On the day in question, there was one car parked 
on the curb on the right side of the driver. It was at the 
point of this car that the boy came out and into contact 
\vith the mail truck. The driver said he didn't see the boy, 
that he was looking down the street to determine where 
the other mail carrier was. The appellate court in ruling 
on the matter of negligence said: 
"In the operation of this mail truck with the 
kno-vvledge he had from a year's experience in driv-
ing this street, Noble, the driver, was duty bound 
to exercise reasonable care for the safety of the 
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children of this residential district as he would 
have had, had he been driving by a school house." 
"The driver was chargeable with seeing the child-
ren both in front of him and to the left and right." 
This same rule is pronounced in the case of Bennett 
vs. Deaton, 58 Pacific 2nd, 895. The U. S. Appellate Court 
further quoted Bejington vs. Horton, 102 Pacific 2nd. 652, 
and Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Blash-
field, 2 A Sec. 1491, as follows: 
''Of all the cases of destruction of lives and 
homes that have followed the wake of the motor 
vehicle; that of mangling of the children beneath 
its wheels carries the most poignant sense of trag-
edy. This is partly due to the contrast between 
their innocence and helplessness on the one hand 
and the ponderousness of the machine that crushes 
them into the earth on the other. The safeguarding 
of the child has always appealed to the protective 
instincts of man, whether civilized or savage, and 
the humanitarian driver of an automobile, when 
the time and place is such that the presence of 
children in the neighborhood and therefore their 
excursions into the streets may reasonably be ex-
pected, will have his machine under such control 
that it can be stopped almost instantly." 
"Courts have said that careful and competent 
drivers do not have accidents. While this statement 
of course is not intended to be taken in its exact 
literal import, there is some element of truth in 
it, and it ought certainly to be made true where 
children are concerned." 
Even though in the Cotant case the child ran from 
behind a parked vehicle, and even though the child was 
struck by his contact with the side of the mail truck, and 
even though it was in a residential district, the Court com-
mented that the care of the driver spould be as careful as 
in front of a school house (the instant case) all such fact-
ors less favorable to Plaintiff than in the instant case the 
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lf. S. Appellate Court stated, 
"without further detailing the evidence, the 
Court, in taking the evidence as a whole, is satis-
fied that the driver of the Governn1ent Mail truck 
was clearly guilty of negligence." 
Another case almost identical, but which also is not 
as strong as the instant case, even when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the defendant and respondent here-
in, is the case of Sweitzer vs Anderson 83 NW 2nd. 416. 
This is an accident where a child is returning from school, 
and though the child was three blocks from the school, 
the motorist passed the school house prior to the accident, 
and had seen the children who had just been dismissed. 
The child who was run into and injured by the motorist ran 
from the side of the street into the road. The Court held 
that the maintenance of a reasonable lookout by the defend-. 
ant included watching the sides of the street for children 
who might reasonably be expected to be there on their 
vvay home from school, as well as the center of the street, 
and that the defendant, therefore should have seen the 
plaintiff, Michael, both before and after he had started 
running toward the street and that if she had so seen him, 
she could with reasonable care have avoided the accident. 
The Court stated in its decision as follows: 
"When children may be expected along a street, 
a motorist may not limit his view to a roadway 
ahead of him, but has a duty to watch the sides 
of the street as well." 
The Appellate Court in this case reversed the trial court 
and ordered a new trial. 
It is contended that there is no place in the world 
vv here small children are entitled to greater protection, 
greater care, and where more vigilance for their safety 
should be exercised than at the school grounds. If any 
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court, by its decree, permits a driver, especially of a heavy 
laden truck, to pass immediately in front of an elementary 
school house just before school takes up, where the driver 
continues to increase his speed to twenty miles an hour 
watching children on the playground without ever seeing 
a child who has crossed 18V2 ft, into the street on her way 
to the school house, and holds that the same does not con-
stitute negligence of the driver, after he runs her down 
and crushes the child into the earth, the court would there-
by countenance like conduct of other drivers, and school 
would not be an adequately safe place for parents to send 
their children. 
II. 
ERROR OF TRIAL COURT IN REFUSING TO ADMIT 
EVIDENCE OF PHYSICAL FACTS RELATING TO 
LENGTH OF TIME IT TOOK EACH OF 14 GIRLS 
SAME AGE, SIZE AND EXPERIENCE AS DECEDENT 
TO WALK, OR RUN DISTANCE OF 100FT. 
The trial Court committed error in refusing to admit 
evidence submitted by the Plaintiff as to the length of time 
it took each of 14 girls, who were each of about the same 
~-ge, size and years of experience in school as was N ila 
Hales, the decedent, to walk normally, walk fast as they 
could, and run fast as they could, a distance of 100 feet; 
which evidence was to be used by an expert physicist to 
determine the distance the truck traveling at either 15 or 
20 miles per hour traveled, while the girl traveled from 
the north edge of the mother's car to the point of in1pact, 
18 feet 5 inches from the south curb or 11 feet 6 inches 
from the north side of the mother's car, and how long the 
driver was inattentive as to what was the11e to be seen. 
In establishing the negligence of the defendant truck 
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driver, probably no fact siooa out more important than 
that he drove a big loaded gravel truck with six tons of 
gravel past an elementary school house at 8:45 a.m. in the 
morning just before school started, and while the students 
were coining to school, driving at a speed of from 15 to 20 
tniles per hour without ever seeing the child who was 
erasing the street in front of him. This is according to his 
O\vn testimony. ( R 201). It took a certain length of time for 
the child to get into the street where she had contact with 
the truck. The truck driver drew a line on the diagram 
(Exhibit Pl. 9) as to his course of travel and testified that 
the right wheels of the truck he was driving went right 
over the area where the spot of blood was measured to be 
18ft. 5 inches from the south curb. Allowing the defendant 
driver the benefit of every doubt and supposing that the 
child became visible at the north edge of the mother's car 
(and even a casual observation would have seen her be-
fore that) she still traveled 11 ft. 6 inches before impact 
with the truck, the mother having testified that her car 
\vas 70 inches wide and parked -vvithin 6 inches of the 
curb. (R 156). For the purpose of this argument, it doesn't 
matter too much which part of the truck struck the child, 
and the evidence is just as important and vital if the child 
were \valking normally, walking fast, or running fast, 
plaintiff 'vas prepared to show how long it took her to get 
to the path of the vehicle, and how far the vehicle traveled 
after she came into view, regardless of whether she \vas 
\valking normally, walking fast, or running fast. David 
\Veldon stated that while he was sitting in the swing he 
\vatched her walk to a position near the center of the road, 
then holler "help, help!" on observing the truck, and that 
she was then hit with the front bumper, knocked out in 
front of the truck and then run over with the right front 
\Vheel (R 129). After intensive cross examination by de-
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fendant's couns~l as to the distance away the truck was 
at various times, the testimony remained final and the 
same. The testimony of the witness is as follows, as given 
on recross examination by defendant counsel: 
''Q. Now did you think Nila was walking? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in which direction do you think she was 
walking? 
A. She was walking from the opera house to the 
school house. 
Q. And you think that she was walking from 
near the opera house to the school house and you 
think she was in the middle of the street? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at that time the truck was down by the 
post office?. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you think that she was walking 
til she was hit? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now why do you say you think? Why do you 
use the words, "you think" (argument of counsel) 
Q. Why do you say you think, son? 
A. Well, I am not positive that it is. 
Q. You are not what? 
A. Positive of the truth. 
Q. I see. 
Mr. Eliason; Of what? Of how far the truck was, 
or what? 
Mr. Hanson: Let's let the little boy explain what 
he means. What do you mean you are not positive 
as to the truth? 
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A. Well, I can't exactly tell you how far the 
truck was. 
Q. Is there anything else you are not positive 
about, son? 
A. No. 
Q. You can't exactly tell us how far down the 
street the truck was? 
A. No. 
Q. vVhy do you say you think the little girl was 
crossing the street? 
A. Well, I am positive she was walking, I'm pos-
itive of that. 
If the measurements made by Mr. Nielson, the princi-
pal, had been permitted it could have been explained to 
the jury that the average speed that girls of this age and 
size walk is 4.4 ft. per second; that the fastest that any of 
these girls could run was a speed equivalent to 9 miles 
per hour. It could then further have been testified to the 
jury from simple mathematical deductions, that while the 
child vvalked 11 ft. the truck going 15 miles per hour trav-
eled 55 ft., and the truck if traveling 20 miles per hour 
traveled during that same time, a distance of 73 ft. That 
if the child had been running as fast as the fastest of any 
of the 14 girls her age could run the full distance to the 
point of impact, the truck would have traveled 17 ft. even 
at 15 1\LP.H. during such time. That in allowing .3 of a 
second as reaction time, the truck driver should be able 
to stop upon observing danger within 7 feet at 15 miles 
per hour and within 9 feet at 20 miles per hour. 
Further than that, the physicist would have been 
able to testify as to how far and how fast the child 
,,~auld haYe bounced back away from the truck had she 
run into the side of the truck at any given speed, and the 
evidence "\vould conclusively show that if the child ran 
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into the side of the truck at a speed of 4Y2 m.p.h. or great-
er, that she would have bounced back away from the bed 
of the truck, and out of the line of the wheels, and that it 
would have been absolutely impossible as a physical pro-
position for the child to be run over by the right wheel or 
wheels of the truck and left her body laying approximately 
parallel witb the road 18 ft. 5 in. from the south curb with 
the truck following essentially a straight course prior to 
impact. 
This testimony of either the fastest speed of these 14 
girls or the average speed was essential in the establishing 
of this phase of the Plain tiffs' case. There are no charts or 
reports or even expert testimony which could have provid-
ed the information. It was the most important, relevant and 
n1aterial issue of the ease, and yet it was ruled out upon 
defendant's objection on the grounds of materiality, which 
ruling is reversible error. There may have been some ar-
gument that 14 students was not a representative number, 
but the court held that it was representative but there is 
no question as to materiality. 
The courts have universally held that experimental 
evidence is admissable if it substantially tends to establish 
the fact that it is offered to prove. (Martin vs. Angel City 
Baseball Assoc. 40 P 2 287.) Even though there is not a 
known Utah case involving the identical fact situation, 
the Supreme Court of this State has ruled in favor of ex-
perimental evidence in the case of Coon vs. Utah Con-
struction Company, 228 P2 997. The case is an action for 
damages to plaintiff's home allegedly consisting of en-
largement of cracks in foundation and masonry walls from 
excessive vicration caused by defendant's trucks operated 
over highway adjacent to plaintiff's home, when defend-
ant made tests to 1neasure vibration caused by trucks, the 
evidence of the tests was admissable. 
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In the case of Kling vs. City and County of Denver, 
335 P2 876, police cars were driven over road where acci-
dent occurred at speeds above and below that of passenger 
outomobile and it was held that any variations went to 
the weight, not the admissability. 
In a prosecution for homicide, in which one of the 
points made by the prisoner is that he could not have 
walked from his premises to the scene of the homicide in 
tin1e to have fired the shot, a witness may testify to trav-
ersing the distance in a specified length of time, State vs. 
Flyer 69 S.E. 269, Jones Commentary on Evidence, Vol. 2, 
pp. 1382. 
The experimental evidence in the instant case is not 
objectionable on the grounds that two people are dissimi-
lar in their speeds or actions, because the length of time 
that it took these 14 representative girls of the age, size, 
and grade in school as the decedent to walk or run a given 
distance is neither speculative or uncertain. The jury can 
then determine from other evidence in the case whether 
the child walked or ran and which computation is appli-
cable. 
III. 
ERROR OF' TRIAL COURT IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY PLAINTIFF 
AS TO PRESUMPTION OF DUE CARE ON THE PART 
OF THE DECEDENT. 
The truck driver defendant by his own testimony 
stated that he was driving his heavy laden truck past this 
elemenetary school house, at a time just before school 
took up, at 8:45 a.m. That he was continually picking up 
speed in front of the school to a maximum of 20 miles per 
hour. That he was watching the children over in the 
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school grounds, and did not see the decedent at all even 
thongh she traveled a distance of at least 11 ft. 6 in. in 
plain view of him in the street away from anything that 
would in any way interfere with his vision of her. By any 
standard of measurement, this conduct is below the care 
exercised by the reasonably prudent person, and should 
have justified a Plaintiff verdict. 
But the plaintiffs' case was seriously prejudiced and 
damaged by the court instructing the jury twice, (instruc-
tions 8 and 13) on contributory negligence, and then the 
court committed the most serious error prejudicing the 
plaintiffs' case in refusing to instruct the jury on the pre-
sumption of due care of the decedent at and prior to im-
pact. Plaintiff phrased his requested instruction exactly 
in the words of JIFU 16.8 which is the same asCF. BAJL, 
135-A1. The Utah Supreme Court has on repeated occa-
sions held that the decedent plaintiff is as a matter of 
right entitled to such presumption, Tuttle vs. PIE 242 P2 
764; Lewis vs. D&RGW Ry. Co., 123 P 97; Mecham vs. 
Allen 262 P2 285. 
Plaintiffs' requested Instruction No. 14 read as fol-
lows: 
"You are instructed that based upon the com-
monly kno-vvn fact that the instinct for self preserv-
aion is such that persons use ordinary and reason-
able care for their own safety, the law permits you 
to assume that Nila Hales, at the time of and im-
mediately preceding the incident in question, was 
exercising due care for her own safety. And you 
may make findings inaccordance therewith unless 
you are persuaded fro1n a pr@ponderance of the 
evidence that she was guilty of contributory neg-
ligence, as elsewhere in these instructions defined." 
The decedent, a 9 year old girl, under the circumstances~ 
of this case, crossing a street immediately in front of the 
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school house at a time just as school was nearly ready to 
begin, is generally entitled to an instruction requiring pass-
ing motorist to refrain from any conduct which n1ay injure 
her requested in Pl. Instruction No. 8, 9, and 10 and if not 
that instruction, most certainly the instruction on presump-
tion of due care for self preservation. Inasmuch as the truck 
driver or no other witness observed the conduct of the child 
at or immediately prior to impact, unless it were the two 
school children, David Weldon, who said the child walked 
fro1n the opera house, south curb, to the school house, got 
nearly to the middle of the road, hollered "help, help!" be-
fore the truck hit her with a front bumper, or the very un-
certain testimony of Jerold Christensen who said he saw a 
glimpse of Nila on the opposite side of the truck through 
the small space between the cab and the bed, which condi-
tion is first impossible from the diagonal he was looking, 
and second which testimony, if accepted, in its entirety in 
the light 1nost favorable to defendant, does not add inform-
ation as to her conduct at time of ilnpact as to negative due 
care of decedent. 
IV. 
ERROR OF TRIAL COURT IN INSTRUCTING JURY 
TWICE ON NEGLIGENCE, PROXIMATE CAUSE AND 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
In Paragraph B of the Court's instructions No. 8, the 
Court states, 
"Contributory negligence" is negligence on the 
part of a person involved which cooperating with 
the negligence of another, assists in proximately 
causing his own injury. One who is guilty of con-
tributory negligence may not recover from anoth-
er for any injury suffered because if both parties 
were at fault in negligently causing the injury, the 
degree of negligence cannot be weighed by the 
jury." 
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In Instruction No. 13, the Court insrtucted as follows: 
"Paragraph 3" That before you can find the 
verdict for the plaintiff in this case, you must find 
from a preponderance of evidence that the defend-
ant, Paul Caldwell, was negligent, 2. that his neg-
ligence was the proximate cause of the injury, and 
3. that there was no negligence on the part of Nila 
Hales, which proximately contributed to her own 
injury and death." In Instruction No. 5 giving in-
structions on burden of proof, the court recited 
that it was the burden of the defendant to prove 
that Nila Hales was contributorily negligent as 
alleged in defendant's answer and that the negli-
gence of Nila Hales, deceased, if any, would be im-
puted to her parents, the plaintiffs herein. 
And then the Court again in their instruction No. 11 
gave the following instructions: 
"You are instru.cted that the mere fact that an 
accident occurred is no evidence of negligence and 
that the fact that this accident occurred is no indi-
cation that the defendants in this action were neg-
ligent. You are further instructed that accidents 
are sometimes unavoidable and the law recognizes 
unavoidable accidents, and in such cases lets the 
loss rest upon whom it falls. Therefore if you find 
from the evidence in this case that the accident re-
ferred to in the plaintiff's complaint was unavoid-
able so far as the defendants were concerned, then 
your veTdict should be in favor of the defendants 
and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action." 
With two instructions on contributory negligence, a 
refusal to grant plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No. 14 on 
presumption of due care, refusal to give plaintiffs' In-
struction Nos. 8, 9, and 10, which outlines the care due a 
child of tender years in front of a school and then to get a 
further instruction on unavoidable accidents couched in 
the language of Instruction No. 11, plaintiffs' case \vas so 
prejudiced and the jury vvere so deluded with the respons· 
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ibilities of contributory negligence of the decedent child 
that it was impossible for plaintiffs' to have a fair trial. 
In some cases, one instruction on contributory negli-
gence is very proper and generally is a question of fact for 
the jury, but in an action like the case at bar, it becomes 
a question of law for the court. Where the established 
facts and the circumstances permit only the one possible 
conclusion, and where, as in this case, the record is lack-
ing of any substantial evidence either direct or circum-
stantial, adduced either by the appellant or respondent 
sufficient to establish contributory negligence on the part 
of N ila Hales the court should not have left the rna tter of 
contributory negligence to the jury. The Supreme Court 
of Utah and other courts have ruled upon the impropriety 
of leaving the question of contributory negligence to the 
jury in such matters, even where the. presumption of due 
care did not exist. Bennett vs. Deaton 68 P2, 895, and Bell 
vs. Carlson 270 P2 420. 
v. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION ON 
UNA VOIDABLE ACCIDENTS 
Although the matter of the instruction on unavoid-
able accidents is referred to in the argument on Point IV 
above, to point out the cumulative effect of the several 
adverse instructions prejudicing the plaintiffs' case, it is 
desirable to point out the error of such instruction in this 
case. There are some few instances where due to weather 
conditions or an act of God or an extreme emergency, that 
an instruction on unavoidable accident may be justified, 
but in the present case, it is highly prejudicial. The defend-
ant testified that he did not see the child, that he was 
\vatching children over on the playground. He stated that 
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he continuously accelerated his speed past the school 
house to 20 miles per hour, and that when he felt the 
truck run over something he stopped to determine what 
it was. In the instant case, there is no evidence that the 
accident resulted from any cause other than negligence. 
There were no mechanical difficulties, no other persons 
or vehicles contributing, no weather conditions affecting 
the actions of either party. It is thus clear there was no 
basis in the evidence for giving an instruction on unavoid-
able accident, and clearly such instruction resulted in 
confusing and misleading the jury, prejudicing the plain-
tiffs' case and justifies a reversal. Such a reversal was 
ordered in the similar case of Martz vs. Ruiz, 322 P 2, 981. 
The case of Butigan vs. Yellow Cab Co. 320 P. 2, 500, has 
been quoted and followed frequently in recent decisions 
in support of an instruction on unavoidable accident in 
the language of the Instruction 11 in the instant case, 
being a reversible error, and the Utah Supreme Court has 
had cause, though in entirely different circumstances, to 
comment on the Yellow Cab Co. case. The same rule is 
established in the case and followed in Kelly vs. Hanwick, 
153 So. 267, and which according to Trial & Tort Trends, 
1958, pg. 131, has been followed in 90% of the cases as 
grounds for reversible error states: 
"The instruction is not only unnecessary, but is 
also confusing. When the jurors are told that 'in 
law we recognize what is termed an unavoidable 
or inevitable accident,' they may get the impres-
sion that unavoidability is an issue to be decided, 
and that if proved, it constitutes a separate ground 
of nonliability of the defendant. Thus they may be 
misled as to the proper 1nanner of determining 
liability, that is, solely on the basis of negligence 
and proximate causation." 
The giving of the instruction further obviously over-
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emphasizes the defendant's case and suggests to the jury 
that they should consider unavoidability as an issue or 
ground of defense. An attempt by the jurors to carry out 
such a direction would be expected to result in confusing 
and misleading them, and the Courts generally hold that 
the giving of the instruction under such circumstances 
constitutes prejudicial error. There is no question but 
what the plaintiffs' case, in this instant, was prejudiced by 
the jury being permitted to believe that because the driver 
had not seen the child, the accident was unavoidable. 
Jurors are inclined to confuse unavoidability with 
unintentional. 
In Trial & Tort Trends, 1958, pg. 131, in commenting 
upon the Butigan vs. Yellow Cab Co. case, it states: 
"It is like proving the accident is caused by some 
external cause which was brought in through the 
situation that caused the injury. Over the last six 
months, over the 48 states, there have been 40 or 
50 cases, 9/10 of which resulted in a reversal when 
at the request of the defendant, the Court instruct-
ed the jury on unavoidable accidents." 
VI. 
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF MIS-
CONDUCT JUSTIFYING REVERSIBLE ERROR, AND 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING PLAI~­
TIFF NEW TRIAL WHEN DEF'ENDANT COUNSEL 
STATED IN ARGUMENT TO JURY "INVESTIGATING 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS HAD NOT GIVEN ANY 
CITATION TO THE DEFENDANT DRIVER FOR MIS-
CONDUCT, AND ... l\.CCORDINGLY THEY HAD FOUND 
THE DRIVER NOT NEGLIGENT." 
It is a well known fact that law enforcement officers 
including high,vay patrolmen, CouJJ.ty sheriff officers and 
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city police, enjoy a special reputation especially among 
the laymen, who are the usual group selected for juries. 
It is the common belief of these people that because of 
training and of the office that the officer is in a 
special position to determine the negligence or non-
negligence of any act, and even the guilt or inno-
cence for an act or omission. Great emphasis is placed by 
the ordinary person upon the opinion of officers of the 
law. And for that reason, the rules of evidence properly 
excluded opinion evidence of an officer in determining 
negligence. Perhaps the only person enjoying a higher 
reputation and a greater respect among jurors for their 
position to know and evaluate conduct as constituting 
negligence or guilt is that of a District Judge, who the 
jury serving public have learned will advise and interpret 
the principle of law involved. Following the introduction 
of the testimony in the instant case and the instructions 
by the Court, counsel for each side gave their argument 
to the jury. Former District Judge, Dillworth Woolley, 
had been engaged as associate counsel by the defendants 
in the trial of their case. He is extremely well known in 
the area where court was held, and was frequently re-
ferred to during the course of the tritil as "Judge Woolley." 
He made the closing argument to the jury and among 
other things, stated, 
"That the highway patrolmen and investigating of-
ficers in the case had not issued any arrest or citation for 
wrongdoing in this case against the truck driver, and ac-
cordingly had found that he was not negligent." 
Counsel for Plaintiff immediately arose and objected 
and advised the Court that it was conduct and a statement 
which constituted reversible error. The Court did not 
direct the jury to disregard the statem~nt, nor did he ad-
vise them of the impropriety of such a state1nent. Notice-
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ably the presiding Judge vvas upset and shocked and 
asked his former colleague not to pursue that matter 
further. But the jury was left with the firm impression 
from such statement that the driver had done nothing 
\vrong. Certainly the former Judge knew he was going 
beyond what was admissable or even proper practice, and 
his enthusiasm and desire for his client's case no doubt 
motivated him to stretch that practice which is permiss-
a ble and approved under the standards of practice to mis-
conduct; but in so doing, he seriously and prejudicially 
affected the plaintiffs' case. The trial judge, on the mo-
tion for new trial, though recognizing the statement as im-
proper and adverse to the plaintiff, did not order a new 
trial. To state that this is not prejudicial and damaging to 
the plaintiffs' case is to invite counsel in their exhuberance 
to go beyond what is proper and acceepted practice and 
to engage in impropriety and to that extent the other 
litigant who came into court for a fair trail has had the 
presentation of his case damaged and prejudiced. 
,.,. 
Because the reporter was out of the Court room at 
the time the argument was made and the objection of 
Plaintiffs' counsel presented to the court the presiding 
Judge was requested and did write an affidavit which he 
included in the record, vvhich describes the incident. The 
page is numbered M-388, and reads as follows: 
"This is to certify and affirm that I, Judge John 
L. Sevy, Jr., presided at the trial of the above-
entitled case; that to the best of my recollection 
on closing argument to the jury, defense counsel, 
Dillworth Woolley stated that the highway patrol-
men and investigating officers in the case had not 
issued any arrest or citation in the case. 
Plaintiff's counsel objected to the statement 
and as Judge, I directed Defense Counsel not to 
pursue the matter further. No request was made 
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for a direction to the jury to disregard this state-
ment and no such direction was given by the 
Court." 
This statement is given at the request of Eldon 
A. Eliason, counsel for Plaintiffs as part of the 
record on appeal. 
Dated this 14th day of June, 1960. 
s/ John L. Sevy, Jr. 
District Judge 
Subscribed and sworn to before me the 14th 
day of June, 1960. 
s/ C. Howard W artkin, 
Notary Public. 
Residing at Richfield, Utah 
My Commission expires: 2/4/64" 
lVfiscond uct of counsel in respect of their arguments 
to the jury is discussed in Corpus Juris Second urn, Vol. 
66, Section 36, in the following language: 
"such misconduct of counsel in his remarks to the 
jury may constitute grounds for a new trial, where 
his argument refers to matters not in evidence." 
In the instant case, the argument of counsel went 
even further than referring to matters not in evidence 
he referred to matters which he knew could not have been 
introduced in evidence. In the case of Burbank vs. Mc-
Intyre, 27 Pac. 400, the court held in an automobile ac-
cident case that the trial court's general admonition to 
the jury to disregard counsel's statement in striking out 
the testimony showing arrest of the defendant for reck-
less driving, and the subsequent proceedings did not cure 
the prejudicial effect of such staten1ent. And in the case 
of Laughlin vs LaMar, 237 Pac. 2 1015, held that in a civil 
action for personal injuries resulting from an automobile 
colision it was' reversible error to all~w, over objection, 
introduction in evidence of records in criminal action 
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against the defendant predicated upon the same factual 
situation in the absence of the proof of a plea of guilty to 
the criminal charge. Of the same opinion is the case of 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. vs. Cloonan, 193 Pac. 2 
();)() and Good1vin vs. Continental Casualty Co., 53 Pac. 2, 
241. 
VII. 
ERROR OF THE TRIAL COURT IN NOT INSTRUCTING 
JURY AS TO LAW GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF A 
DRIVER IN FRONT OF A SCHOOL, WHICH WAS IN-
CLUDED IN PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS 
8, 9, 10, WHICH WERE REFUSED. 
The Defendant Paul Caldwell, in his testimony, testi-
fied that the speed limit in the area was 20 miles per hour, 
and defense counsel in their argument to the Jury stressed 
the fact that the driver wasn't, according to his testimony, 
exceeding the speed limit. The only way to impress the 
jury of the care required of a driver under such circuln-
stances, in front of the schoolhouse, driving a heavy laden 
truck, \Vas for the court to instruct the jury on the extent 
of the care and caution required of the driver. Such in-
structions were provided for the court in the requests 
made by the Plaintiffs' counsel, 8-9-10 which read as 
follo-vvs: 
No. 8-"You are further instructed that if the 
defendant driver of the loaded gravel truck, had 
knowledge that minor children, at the time vvhen 
the accident happened, were crossing the street on 
their way to school, that he must take into account 
that because of their tender age, they were incap-
able of foreseeing and understanding the dangers 
of a heavy laden moving truck and that he must 
further take into account the fact that children act 
impul:;ively and swiftly and that the driver is re-
qui~'ed to exercise care commensurate with the ap-
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parent danger and slight or momentary inattention 
may constitute neiglgence where danger is close 
at hand." 
No. 9-"You are further instructed that the driver 
of a loaded gravel truck operating in front of an 
elementary schoolhouse at approximately 8:40 a.m. 
is required to know the tendencies and impulsive 
action of minor children. You are instructed that 
if you find that he knew of the presence of the 
children, that he is responsible for their safety, as 
he approaches their school house and the path-
way they use in going to school." 
No. 10-"You are instructed that the defendant 
driver claims he did not see the child, which was 
run over and killerl. You are further instructed 
that a driver of a heavy laden truck who has knowl-
edge of the presence of children and who operates 
it in front of the school at a time when children 
are coming to school and using the street as a 
pathway to the school house, may be responsible 
for injury or death to a child even though he did 
not see the injured child in time to prevent the 
injury." 
which instructions were denied and to which the Plaintiff 
took exception. 
In the California Court in the case of Lampton vs. 
Davis Standard Bread Co., 191 Pac. 2-710, the court in 
ruling on that matter stated: 
"That the proximity of the place where Gra-
ham was driving to the adjacent school grounds, 
and the hour at which children might with certain-
ty be expected to be using the street, imposed upon 
him a greater degree of caution than he might be 
required to use under ordinary circumstances. That 
which would be but ordinary negligence in refer-
ence to a grown person n1ay be gross negligence 
as respects a child.'' 
In ConToy vs. Perez, 148 P 2, 680, the court said: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
"If the evidence -vvas that a driver had know ledge of 
the presence of children, he may be held to have 
been responsible for their safety, although it ap-
pears that he did not see the injured child in time 
to prevent the injury." 
The case of Frederickson vs. Costner, 221 P 2-1008 
holds that if the driver knows of the presence of children 
in the proximity of the vehicle, he may be held to be re-
sponsible for their safety. Of the same opinion is Brousseau 
vs. Carnation Co., 290 P 2-588. 
SUMMARY 
In the summary of this case, several matters stand 
out vvhich either considered alone or with all the circum-
stances of the case, establish the error which prevented 
the Plaintiffs from having a fair trial. The appellate Court 
should consider in this appeal both from the facts of the 
case and the supporting cases forming a precedent that 
not only the granting of a new trial is supported by the 
Plaintiff's case, but a reversal of the decision with instruc-
tions for new trial on element of damages. The overvvheln1-
ing evidence of negligence on the part of Jhe defendant 
driver, without any showing of contributory negligence 
on the part of the minor child, and the minor child being 
in the position of enjoying a presumption of due care, 
would clearly justify the court in reversing the decision, 
awarding judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the negli-
gence of the defendant and requiring a further hearing 
only upon the element of damages. 
It is not uncommon for defendant in a wrongful death 
case to admit liability and present to the court the case 
only on the amount of damages. 
The plaintiff in the summary in support of such prop-
osition first calls the attention of the court to the testimony 
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of Dr. Noys who stated in his opinion that the child's head, 
groin, and legs were run over by the wheels of the truck 
(Rl3). The testimony of David Willden, that the child was 
hit with the front bumper after she had walked nearly to 
the center of the road (R128), the testimony of the officers 
that the body lay 18 ft. 5 in. in'to the street, where it had 
been crushed, (R79), testimony of the defendant driver 
that he drove his vehicle at an increasing rate of speed 
past the school to 20 miles per hour on a course where the 
right wheels were over the spot where the child's body 
lay, (R146). That he did not see the child at all but felt 
the bump when the right wheel passed over her, (R145). 
T·he testimony of the officer that the defendant driver was 
watching the children on the playgrounds, (R201). This 
testimony is conclusive as to the negligence of the driver. 
The child could not have injured herself in any way and 
have been left lying parallel in the road, her head to the 
east and her feet to the west, the truck having come from 
the west, and the right wheels having run over her body. 
The cases are not only overwhelmingly in favor of the 
plaintiff in such cases where a child is injured by such 
conduct of a motorist, but they are close to unanimous. 
The case of Larsen vs. Jer01ne Cooperative Crea?nery, an 
Idaho case, 283, P 2-1096, held in the wrongful death of 
a 9 year old boy when he had been run over with a milk 
truck which had backed over him, that in an action for 
wrongful death, that where there were no eye witnesses 
and no circumstances indicating clearly to the contrary, 
that there is presumption that the person killed was at the 
time of the accident in the exercise pf due care and caution 
which, arising by reason of the natural instincts for self 
preservation and known disposition to preserve and pro-
tect one's self fro1n personal injury. Such presumption is 
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given the effect of prima facie evidence unless satisfactor-
ily rebutted or a fact contrary to the conctusion is proved. 
The Cotant vs. U. S. case (3 Federal Supplment 770) pre-
viously referred to, covers all questions raised in the in-
stant case, and the instant case is much stronger in favor 
of the plaintiff on every point. There is no escape from the 
same ruling as that in the Cotant case. 
Any one of the errors of the Court on Instructions, as 
enumerated herein constitutes prejudice and justifies re-
versal: 1. The failure to instruct on the presumption of 
due care, 2. two instructions on contributory negligence-
(8 & 13), 3. a further instruction on unavoidable accident, 
and 4. failure to give plaintiffs' instructions, 8-9-&10 as to 
care required in front of a school house. 
To further prejudice the plaintiffs' case, the miscon-
duct of counsel in arguing to the Jury that the law en-
forcement officers had not given any citation or found any 
-vvrong in the defendant driver. In the case of Shatv vs. 
Pacific Greyhound, 323 P 2, 391, the court holds that if a 
challenged instruction was erroneous in any degree, even 
if it is only fairly debatable, that such instruction may 
have been misleading, and justifies a new trial. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held in 9 Utah 5 - 336 
P 2-781 Ivy vs. Richardson, that in determining -vvhether 
a new trial was warranted, question was whether the case 
\vas presented to the jury in such a manner that it was 
reasonable to believe that there was a fair and impartial 
analysis of the evidence, and a just verdict and if errors 
vvere committed \vhich prevented that being done, then 
a nevv trial should be gran ted whether it resulted from 
one error or from several errors cumulatively. 
The further case of Bo1.vden vs. D&RGRR-3 Utah 2nd 
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444-286 P 2 240, has been that either the Court is con-
vinced that the party to the action has not had a fair trial 
because of court's failure to instruct properly, it is not 
only the court's privilege, but solemn duty in the interest 
of justice to grant a new trial. 
The plaintiffs respectfully submit that the facts and 
circumstances of this case require in the interest of justice 
and fairness that the judgment of the trial court be re-
versed, as herein prayed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELDON A. ELIASON, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
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